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COMMENT

PUBLIC CLIENT CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACTS AS
OBLIGATION
Seth Mayer*
Contingency fee contracts predicate an attorney’s compensation on the outcome of a case. Such contracts are widely accepted when used in civil litigation
by private plaintiffs who might not otherwise be able to afford legal representation. However, such arrangements are controversial when government
plaintiffs like attorneys general and local governments retain private lawyers
to litigate on behalf of the public in return for a percentage of any recovery
from the lawsuit. Some commentators praise such public client contingency fee
contracts, which have become commonplace, as an efficient way to achieve justice. Critics, however, view them as corrupt, undemocratic, and unethical.
This Comment contributes to this debate by arguing that public client contingency fee contracts are not only permissible, as some have argued, but that
certain legal doctrines obligate government entities to form these contracts.
First, this Comment contends that the principle that government litigators
have a special duty to “seek justice” obligates government actors to enter into
public client contingency fee contracts. The obligation to form such contracts
is triggered when civil justice requires enforcement, but constraints prevent
government attorneys from pursuing litigation. This contention undermines
critics’ claim that the “seek justice” principle means public client contingency
fee contracts are impermissible. Second, this Comment argues that the public
trust doctrine also obliges government entities to form public client contingency fee contracts in some instances. These arguments undermine attacks on
public client contingency fee contracts and demonstrate the existence of a heretofore ignored obligation in public civil litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Thousands of plaintiffs, including states, counties, and cities, have joined
the sprawling litigation against companies that manufactured, distributed,
and sold opioids, seeking damages for a crisis that has caused hundreds of
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thousands of deaths. 1 Many of the government entities bringing suit have retained private counsel on a contingency fee basis. 2 Some critics decry governments’ use of such contingency fee contracts as creating conflicts of interest,
duplicative litigation, and obstacles to settlement, among other things. 3 Others suggest these contracts empower under-resourced governments to bring
complicated lawsuits that are in the public interest. 4 At least since the tobacco
litigation of the 1990s, where government officials also relied upon contingency fee agreements with private attorneys, such arrangements have been
controversial. 5
Public client contingency fee contracts, as this Comment will term them,
involve private attorneys agreeing with public officials like state attorneys general to litigate on behalf of the public in exchange for payment. 6 As with many
contingency fee agreements, their payment is usually a percentage of any
monetary relief these private attorneys recover during the litigation, though
government actors can cap or otherwise regulate such fee arrangements. 7
Public client contingency fee contracts have been the subject of legal and
political dispute. For instance, legislators in Minnesota unsuccessfully tried to
ban these agreements when an outside firm earned $125 million after recovering $900 million for the state in a water contamination lawsuit. 8 Similarly,
the West Virginia attorney general unsuccessfully litigated against private
lawyers hired by his predecessor in an attempt to reduce their contingency
fees. 9 At the federal level, President George W. Bush imposed a ban on public

1. Valerie Bauman, States, Cities Eye $26 Billion Deal: Opioid Litigation Explained,
Bloomberg L. (July 26, 2021, 5:31 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/states-cities-eye-26-billion-deal-opioid-litigation-explained [perma.cc/JF5V-Y6XM].
2. See Jan Hoffman, Opioid Settlement Talks Stumble with Trial Set for Monday, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/health/opioids-settlementtalks.html [perma.cc/PFJ4-YG9S].
3. See Steven M. Sellers, U.S. Chamber Warns That Cities Are Litigating Too Much (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 7, 2019, 10:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/u-schamber-warns-that-cities-are-litigating-too-much-1 [perma.cc/66QS-LP6C].
4. Id.
5. Barry Meier, Lawyers in Early Tobacco Suits to Get $8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/12/us/lawyers-in-early-tobacco-suits-to-get-8-billion.html [perma.cc/J798-AYVG] (quoting several critics of fees paid to private attorneys in public tobacco litigation).
6. David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation
of Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2001).
7. See id. at 321.
8. Eric Rasmussen & Joe Augustine, AG Did Not Fully Disclose Campaign Contributions
from Firm Tapped to Lead Fight Against JUUL, KSTP (Jan. 10, 2022, 3:12 PM), https://kstp.com/5investigates/ag-did-not-fully-disclose-campaign-contributions-from-firm-tapped-to-lead-fightagainst-juul [perma.cc/H2VE-ZSW4].
9. Eric Eyre, Morrisey’s Office Turns Against Its Appointed Lawyers in Fee Disputes,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/morrisey-soffice-turns-against-its-appointed-lawyers-in-fee-disputes/article_65be4315-eeee-5144-9f65422c4dd8ac08.html [perma.cc/QX8M-XGXC].
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client contingency fee agreements via executive order. 10 More recently, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari when an opioid manufacturer objected to a
lawsuit by New Hampshire because the state had relied on private contingency
fee lawyers. 11
Critics attack public client contingency fee contracts as undemocratic,
unethical, contrary to the separation of powers, abusive, and threatening to
public authority, among other things. 12 By contrast, proponents hail them as
crucial to achieving civil justice in an era of hostility toward litigation on behalf of plaintiffs. 13 This Comment goes beyond previous defenses of public
client contingency fee contracts: it argues not just that they are permissible but
that, in some circumstances, attorneys general and other public officials are
actually ethically obligated to form them.
One major criticism of such agreements rests on a comparison between
the ethical obligations of government civil litigators and those of criminal
prosecutors. 14 It is a fixed point in legal ethics that criminal prosecution for
profit is unethical. 15 Some argue the prohibition on prosecution for profit is
based on criminal prosecutors’ broader duty to “seek justice.” Specifically,
they contend that these obligations, which demand that criminal prosecutors
embody neutrality, extend to government civil litigators as well. 16 Empowering a private attorney to earn a contingency fee by winning monetary relief on
behalf of the government in civil litigation undermines that neutrality, they
contend. 17 Critics worry profit-driven motivations may warp a private attorney’s decisionmaking, leading them to deviate from making the kind of litigation choices someone representing the public is obliged to make. 18 In short,
critics fear that private attorneys will not honor—or at least will not appear to
honor—the obligation to “seek justice” that arguably applies to government
attorneys. 19
This argument cuts in both directions, however. As this Comment will
explain, the “seek justice” principle relied upon by critics to condemn public

10. Exec. Order No. 13,433, 72 Fed. Reg. 28,441 (May 16, 2007).
11. State v. Actavis Pharma, Inc., 167 A.3d 1277 (N.H. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1261
(2018).
12. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional and Political Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77 (2010); Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 576–78 (2016).
13. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 668–70 (2012).
14. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 12, at 89–90.
15. See, e.g., Price v. Caperton, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 207, 208 (1864); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n,
951 A.2d 428, 475 n.48 (R.I. 2008); Peter Lushing, The Fall and Rise of the Criminal Contingent
Fee, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498, 500 (1991).
16. Leah Godesky, Note, State Attorneys General and Contingency Fee Arrangements: An
Affront to the Neutrality Doctrine?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 589–90 (2009).
17. Redish, supra note 12, at 102–05.
18. Id. at 105.
19. See, e.g., People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Ct., 705 P.2d 347, 351–53 (Cal. 1985).
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client contingency fee contracts, as well as other doctrines, actually creates an
obligation to enact these contracts. 20 Criminal prosecutors’ obligations involve exercising discretion about when not to bring cases, as well as when to
bring them, depending on what justice demands. 21 If the same obligation to
“seek justice” applies in both criminal and civil enforcement, government attorneys are similarly obligated to bring some civil enforcement actions. 22 Further, an additional ground affirmatively obligates public officials to bring suit
in certain circumstances: the public trust doctrine. 23 Under this doctrine, the
state holds certain resources in trust on behalf of the public and is sometimes
obligated to sue in order to protect them. 24
Despite these affirmative requirements to file some suits, resource constraints prevent government attorneys from bringing every required civil enforcement action. 25 In the nonideal, actual world in which civil enforcement
operates, public client contingency fee contracts are sometimes the only realistically available route to discharging their obligations. 26 As a result, in cases
where civil justice requires enforcement, but resource constraints prevent
government attorneys from pursuing litigation, contracting with private attorneys can become an ethical obligation. 27
Commentators do not universally agree that the “seek justice” principle
applies to public civil litigation, and this Comment takes no position on this
question. 28 Instead, by pointing to the “seek justice” principle and the public
trust doctrine, it draws out the affirmative obligation to bring some public litigation, which, in turn, creates an obligation to form public client contingency
fee contracts. Although a full theory of when an obligation to form such contracts is triggered is beyond the scope of this Comment, these arguments
demonstrate the existence of a previously ignored obligation in public civil
litigation contexts.
This Comment argues that when government officials are obliged to bring
civil suits but lack the resources to do so, they have an affirmative obligation
to form public client contingency fee contracts. Part I provides historical background about contingency fee contracts, the potential benefits such arrangements offer to public clients and their constituencies, and some of the risks

20. See discussion infra Sections III.A–C.
21. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
619–20 (1999).
22. See discussion infra Sections III.A–B.
23. See discussion infra Section III.D.
24. See discussion infra Section III.D.
25. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 13, at 668–69.
26. See discussion infra Section III.C.
27. See discussion infra Section III.C.
28. For one argument against applying the “seek justice” principle to public civil litigation, see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951 (1991).
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that have prompted calls to reform or limit public client contingency fee contracts. Part II explains why some commentators have argued that government
litigators have an ethical obligation to “seek justice” that is inconsistent with
the formation of public client contingency fee contracts. Part III counters
these criticisms, arguing that, at least in some circumstances, the “seek justice”
principle and the public trust doctrine indicate that public officials have an
affirmative obligation to form public client contingency fee contracts.
I.

PUBLIC CLIENT CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACTS

This Part introduces public client contingency fee contracts and explains
their general role in litigation, as well as some of the arguments that have been
made for and against reliance upon them in the specific context of government civil litigation. Section I.A provides historical background on the role of
contingency fee contracts and the reasons public clients have relied on them
and viewed them as beneficial. Section I.B presents some critics’ concerns
about public client contingency fee contracts and evaluates the responses and
reforms those criticisms have prompted.
A. Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts and Their Advantages
Public client contingency fee arrangements emerge from the broader usage of contingency fees in legal practice. Once controversial, contingency fees
are now used widely in civil contexts—including in suits brought by public
clients like attorneys general and city governments—but are banned in criminal prosecutions. 29
1.

The Evolution of the Legal Community’s Attitude toward Contingency
Fees

While English common law prohibited contingency fee contracts, categorizing them as illicit champerty, American courts ultimately accepted them in
the nineteenth century as a legitimate way for clients without resources to retain civil representation. 30 Under contingency fee agreements, the client pays
nothing unless their attorney secures a recovery through settlement or litigation; their lawyer effectively finances the suit and assumes the risk that it could

29. See Godesky, supra note 16, at 587–88; Lushing, supra note 15, at 500.
30. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 231–34, 259 (1998). The shift
away from English skepticism of contingency fee arrangements may have resulted from distinctive American political and religious dynamics. Id. at 248 (“[T]he selection of jurists by a political
process resting on an increasingly broad-based franchise, coupled with the pervasive influence
of evangelical thought, substantially explain the propensity of nineteenth century jurists to sanction contingency fee contracts.”).

Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts

October 2022]

151

fail. 31 In doing so, the lawyer has an incentive to maximize the client’s recovery, which is the source of their compensation. 32
Despite their acceptance in civil litigation, courts and professional associations have firmly rejected contingency fee arrangements in the criminal law
context. 33 Given the high stakes of criminal prosecution, the existence of a
contingency fee would raise significant concerns about due process and prosecutorial bias. Prosecutors may be incentivized to pursue criminal convictions
with the goal of monetary gain rather than justice. 34 The Supreme Court has
explained that a prosecutor is “in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer.”35 Criminal prosecutors’ “primary duty . . . is to seek justice within the
bounds of the law, not merely to convict,” so encouraging them to systematically prioritize conviction through financial incentives is problematic. 36 The
justification for contingency fees for criminal convictions is doubly untenable
because the outcome of criminal cases determines someone’s freedom, not the
monetary relief that provides the source for contingency fees in civil suits. 37
In sum, the legal profession and law in the United States welcome contingency fees for private plaintiffs’ attorneys in civil contexts but strictly reject
payment for criminal prosecutors based on convictions. Though some view
contingency fee arrangements as a source of “frivolous” suits and windfalls for
attorneys, the American legal community and broader public have long accepted them as a way to provide access to civil justice for those who otherwise
could not afford it. 38
2.

Public Client Use of Contingency Fee Contracts

In civil litigation, the client agreeing to a contingency fee arrangement is
sometimes a public or government client like an attorney general. Such arrangements began receiving increased attention during the highly visible litigation against tobacco companies in the 1990s when public clients

31. Maureen Carroll, Fee-Shifting Statutes and Compensation for Risk, 95 IND. L.J. 1021,
1027 (2020). Although I focus on contingency fee arrangements that are a percentage of recovery, it is important to note that such agreements can take other forms. See Herbert M. Kritzer,
Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 757–61 (2002).
32. Dana, supra note 6, at 325.
33. See Lushing, supra note 15, at 503 (noting the restrictions on such contracts for both
prosecutors and defense attorneys).
34. See Price v. Caperton, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 207, 208 (1864); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951
A.2d 428, 475 n.48 (R.I. 2008); see also Redish, supra note 12, at 80.
35. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
36. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“Functions and Duties
of the Prosecutor”).
37. See Lushing, supra note 15, at 511.
38. Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 474 (1998).
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successfully relied on them. 39 They remain a source of disagreement today in
the ongoing opioid litigation. 40 As with private clients, when a public client
hires a private attorney using a contingency fee contract, the private attorney
is frequently paid out of the recovery from a suit—but until such a recovery is
made, they receive nothing. 41
In a further parallel to private clients’ use of contingency fee arrangements, public clients rely on such arrangements to overcome limitations or
challenges they face in civil suits. By contracting with private attorneys on a
contingency fee basis, public entities can “bring suits . . . that would otherwise
be impossible due to a lack of personnel resources, expertise, and money.” 42
While state and local budgets for government attorneys are often inadequate
for mounting complex lawsuits against monied corporate defendants with expensive counsel, the plaintiffs’ bar regularly undertakes such cases. 43 Moreover, private firms offer unique talent and expertise in specialized areas of law
when cases call for it, supplementing the knowledge, experience, and staffing
numbers in government attorneys’ offices. 44 As a result, contingency fee arrangements allow public clients to bring more cases with greater prospects of
success than they otherwise would be able to. Such suits can involve a manifold of issues affecting the citizens on whose behalf governments litigate—issues as varied as data privacy, environmental harms, and product liability. 45
While public clients could seek out pro bono attorneys for these cases or
pay an hourly rate, public client contingency fee arrangements have several
advantages that make them more common and, in some cases, the only real
option available. Under such agreements, the government does not have to
rely on the public budget to finance litigation. 46 This financing structure
grants actors, like attorneys general, some independence from the legislature.

39. See Redish, supra note 12, at 81–82.
40. See, e.g., Todd Rokita, Opinion, Cities at Risk of Losing Funding to Fight Opioid Epidemic, DAILY J. (Aug. 24, 2021), https://dailyjournal.net/2021/08/24/todd-rokita-cities-at-riskof-losing-funding-to-fight-opioid-epidemic [perma.cc/Z2ED-6YTR].
41. See Godesky, supra note 16, at 588.
42. Id.
43. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 13, at 668–69.
44. See David B. Wilkins, Rethinking the Public–Private Distinction in Legal Ethics: The
Case of “Substitute” Attorneys General, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 423, 432.
45. For some examples of suits where attorneys general hired private counsel on a contingency fee basis, see MARK BRNOVICH, OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF ARIZ., WRITTEN
DETERMINATION PURSUANT TO A.R.S. § 41-4802 (2021), https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/docs/procurement/AG18-0013-008_Gallagher_Kennedy_Assignment_to_CV2020006219.pdf [perma.cc/6NJT-H5W3] (data privacy litigation); DEP’T OF ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF
MICH., FEE AGREEMENT: PFAS ENVIRONMENTAL TORT LITIGATION (2019), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag/Michigan_PFAS_--_Fee_Agreement_signed_669437_7.pdf [perma.cc/
HMM7-9LGQ] (environmental litigation); OHIO ATT’Y GEN., SECOND RENEWAL OF RETENTION
AGREEMENT FOR FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS LITIGATION (2019) https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/Legal/Outside-Counsel/Contingency-Fee-Information/Frontier-CommunicationsLitigation.aspx [perma.cc/2P7Z-GR6W] (consumer protection litigation).
46. Wilkins, supra note 44, at 432–33.
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Without government budget constraints, an attorney general can bring a suit
even if it is particularly expensive. 47 Although contingency fee arrangements
can become a basis for political attacks, they also give public officials license
to boast that they are protecting the public and saving money at the same
time. 48
An hourly billing arrangement would lack these advantages. Hourly billing can quickly become unaffordable, requiring direct public funding, in addition to failing to incentivize private attorneys to economize during litigation
or maximize recovery. 49 In the majority of cases, pro bono arrangements are
similarly infeasible because public officials cannot depend on attorneys to finance and work on costly, complex litigation with no prospect of compensation. 50 While some cases may work better if structured through an hourly
billing arrangement, through some other fee structure, or on a pro bono basis, 51 contingency fee agreements will be superior when litigation costs are
high, but there is a prospect of recovering high amounts in damages. 52 For
example, the time- and resource-intensive opioid litigation involves both the
risk of loss and the promise of significant recovery for cities, making it a prime
candidate for public client contingency fee arrangements. 53 Given existent
constraints in such cases, either the public entity enters into a contingency fee
arrangement or bringing a suit may become effectively impossible.

47. See Dana, supra note 6, at 319–20. Legislatures can also check this impulse if they
wish. Id. at 321.
48. Wilkins, supra note 44, at 433–34.
49. See id. at 452–53.
50. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 116–35 (2004)
(discussing the various material constraints and incentives that make it unlikely that both large
corporate firms and smaller plaintiff-side firms will take on expensive cases challenging corporate actors on a pro bono basis).
51. For example, if the amount of time a legal project requires is predictable, but it yields
little or no monetary recovery through litigation, an hourly rate may fit best. If a government
needs outside help litigating a zoning dispute, for instance, they might hire an outside firm on
an hourly basis. See, e.g., Government and Municipal, VARNUM (2022), https://www.varnumlaw.com/industry/government-and-municipal [perma.cc/3DMG-KLVM]. Firms may represent governments pro bono in high-profile cases related to issues about which they have
particular concerns. See, e.g., RSHC Prepared City of Chicago’s Amicus Brief Against President
Trump’s Travel Ban, RILEY SAFER HOLMES & CANCILA LLP (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.rshclaw.com/news/news-detail/2017/03/16/rshc-prepared-city-of-chicago-s-amicus-brief-againstpresident-trump-s-travel-ban [perma.cc/BF9E-ANUS].
52. See Wilkins, supra note 44, at 432–34 (discussing how high-cost public civil litigation
can offer a good opportunity for the use of contingency fee lawyers); John C. Coffee, Jr., “When
Smoke Gets in Your Eyes”: Myth and Reality About the Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public
Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 246 (2001) (discussing how contingency fee attorneys are incentivized to focus on maximizing monetary relief to a greater extent than those who bill hourly).
53. See Jan Hoffman, The Core Legal Strategy Against Opioid Companies May Be Faltering, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/11/health/opioids-lawsuitspublic-nuisance.html [perma.cc/9PPH-7JDT].
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Parens Patriae and Other Procedural Advantages of Public Client
Litigation

Public clients can amplify their preexisting advantages in civil litigation
by hiring private counsel. Frequently, public litigation is brought under the
doctrine of parens patriae, which involves the state bringing suit on behalf of
“a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and
economic—of its residents in general.” 54 This doctrine gives the state standing
to sue, including if the alleged “injury is one that the [s]tate, if it could, would
likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” 55 This
doctrine empowers states to bring cases in order to pursue injunctive relief
and damages on behalf of their citizens. 56
By bringing such suits—either through government lawyers or private attorneys—states can help injured parties who might otherwise face insuperable
hurdles to a successful lawsuit. Private plaintiffs have greater obstacles establishing standing than public entities in many cases. 57 They also are sometimes
blocked from bringing suit by class action waivers and mandatory arbitration
clauses in contracts. 58 Heightened standards for class action certification and
challenges created by the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) impact private
plaintiffs as well. 59 A public entity bringing a case under parens patriae does
not generally face these obstacles. 60 For instance, CAFA imposes specific jurisdictional rules on class actions, among other things, but CAFA does not
apply to parens patriae actions. 61 When public clients contract with private
attorneys, the suits they bring still enjoy these advantages, meaning that public
clients can combine their procedural advantages with the resources of private
plaintiffs’ firms. 62
B. Criticisms of Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts
Despite these advantages, as this Section discusses below, some criticize
public client contingency fee arrangements, claiming they threaten to corrupt

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
Id.
Gilles & Friedman, supra note 13, at 661.
Lemos, supra note 12, at 576.
See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 13, at 658–60, 664.
Id.
Lemos, supra note 12, at 576–77.
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161 (2014).
Gilles & Friedman, supra note 13, at 660–61.
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and undermine the deference courts tend to afford public litigation. 63 Nonetheless, courts have proven open to public clients’ reliance on these arrangements, so long as they maintain proper oversight over the litigation. 64
1.

Corruption and Contingency Fee Contracts

Although public client contingency fee arrangements promise many advantages, their use has led to concerns about corruption. Worries about payto-play are especially salient given that private attorneys have sometimes donated to the public official with whom they formed public client contingency
fee contracts. 65 In one case, the attorney general of Texas went to prison for
trying to divert money from the tobacco litigation settlement to a friend. 66 He
was also accused of soliciting “$1 million in political contributions from lawyers he considered hiring for the lawsuit.” 67 If these corrupt dynamics are present, the criticism goes, then quid pro quo agreements, rather than the public
interest, will shape the path of litigation. 68
In reality, public client contingency fee contracts do not present a unique
threat of corruption. For better or worse, government reliance on contracting
has increased over time, encompassing everything from procurement of
goods and services to policymaking by administrative agencies. 69 Concerns
about corruption in government contracts are similarly longstanding; the
phrase pay-to-play actually comes from large corporate defense law firms and
banks using political donations to gain special access to the municipal bond
market. 70 As Professor David Wilkins points out, “the banks and law firms
that engaged in this practice had much more in common with the law firms

63. E.g., Coffee, supra note 52, at 243–46 (discussing concerns about corruption); Lemos,
supra note 12, at 578 (discussing concerns about undermining deference to public litigation).
64. See, e.g., Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Ct., 235 P.3d 21, 39 (Cal. 2010).
65. See, e.g., Bobby Harrison, Despite Controversy over AG’s Use of Outside Lawyers, Most
Attorney General Candidates Would Continue the Practice, MISS. TODAY (June 28, 2019),
https://mississippitoday.org/2019/06/28/despite-controversy-over-ags-use-of-outside-lawyersmost-attorney-general-candidates-would-continue-the-practice [perma.cc/9XDX-HEGT].
66. Clay Robison, Prison Hasn’t Silenced Former Attorney General, CHRON (Jan. 12, 2004),
https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Prison-hasn-t-silenced-former-attorneygeneral-1975087.php [perma.cc/PT2A-AA9Y].
67. Texas Ex-Attorney General Is Charged with Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/us/texas-ex-attorney-general-is-charged-with-fraud.html
[perma.cc/XT8Y-4K87].
68. Andrew Spiropoulos, State AGs Hiring Private Attorneys to Assist in Government Lawsuits, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 10, 2008), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/stateags-hiring-private-attorneys-to-assist-in-government-lawsuits [perma.cc/86HA-VH2X]; see also
Lemos, supra note 12, at 569.
69. See Nina A. Mendelson, Supervising Outsourcing: The Need for Better Design of
Blended Governance, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT 427, 427 (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017).
70. Wilkins, supra note 44, at 435.
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that represent the parties who are objecting to hiring substitute attorneys general in these cases than the plaintiffs’ lawyers who have typically been hired
for this role.” 71 There is nothing specific to public client contingency fee contracts that make them susceptible to corrupting influences, nor are there
strong arguments that special responses to such contracts are necessary. 72
Moreover, many state governments have already imposed reforms to
avoid such corruption in public client contingency fee arrangements. 73 They
have enacted rules requiring greater transparency and record-keeping, competitive bidding, and limitations on lawyers’ fees. 74 Groups like the Chamber
of Commerce and other organizations that lobby on behalf of corporate defendants have advocated for these proposals. 75 Ultimately, such reforms must
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, but if implemented so as not to obstruct
public litigation, those who promote public client contingency fee contracts
need not oppose any reforms that may discourage corruption. 76
2.

Public Litigation’s Special Status and Contingency Fee Contracts

Critics object to more than just corruption in access to public client contingency fee contracts, however. Some contrast democratically supported,
public-interested government litigation with lawsuits brought by the plaintiffs’ bar, depicting the latter as motivated by private interest and lacking democratic legitimacy. 77 They worry that even if the decision to retain outside
counsel is free of corruption and pay-to-play, public litigation, as well as
courts’ perception of it, will suffer because of the involvement of private lawyers. 78
Some express unease that utilizing contingency fee contracts will lead
courts to constrain public litigation in the same ways they have constrained
private plaintiffs’ lawsuits. Courts view litigation by public entities with
greater deference and trust than suits by private parties.79 The latitude public
entities enjoy under parens patriae in the context of standing is just one example of that deference. 80

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 435–36.
Id. at 436.
See Dana, supra note 6, at 316 n.1, 319.
BERNARD NASH ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC
ENFORCEMENT 7–9 (2013), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/
PublicInterestPrivateProfit_FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/H4D2-YHM2].
75. See Godesky, supra note 16, at 609–11.
76. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 13, at 670.
77. See Lemos, supra note 12, at 570; Redish, supra note 12, at 96.
78. See Lemos, supra note 12, at 577–78.
79. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007).
80. Lemos, supra note 12, at 576–78.
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Professor Margaret Lemos argues that reliance on private attorneys
through contingency fee agreements will undermine judicial deference to government litigation: “The stronger the resemblance between public and private
actions, the harder it becomes to defend preferential treatment for government.” 81 Behind this skepticism is a sense that reliance on the plaintiffs’ bar
cheapens public litigation through commodification, undermining its legitimacy. Lemos asks her readers to “[i]magine a criminal prosecution ‘brought
to you by McDonalds’ ” to convey her concerns, noting public litigation has
“a certain gravitas that private litigation lacks.”82 If courts stop viewing government litigation as grounded in the public interest and start to view it as
indistinguishable from profit-seeking, they may become dismissive of government actions. 83
Putting aside the legitimacy of dismissing private lawsuits as mere pursuit
of profit, courts have practiced precisely the deference to government attorneys Lemos describes, generally trusting them to supervise outside counsel.84
In fact, when defendants challenge contingency fee contracts with public clients, courts tend to uphold such agreements. 85 Cases where courts have rejected public client contingency fee agreements are uncommon exceptions,
indicating that Lemos’s worries about contingency fee agreements undermining courts’ attitudes toward public litigation are largely unfounded. 86
81. Id. at 578.
82. Id. at 566, 575.
83. Note, though, that a presumption that the government represents the public interest
in litigation will be controversial in some cases, such as where a private party wants to intervene
on the same side as the government to raise arguments the government is not making. See, e.g.,
Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Rosenfelt, 988 F.3d 556, 561 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 754
(2022). At the least, drawing a stark dichotomy between litigation on behalf of the public interest
and litigation focused purely on private interests is far too simplistic and ought to be questioned.
See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got to Do with It?: Public Interest Lawyering and Profit,
91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 443 (2014).
84. Arguably, public clients’ hiring of private counsel parallels corporate in-house counsel’s hiring of outside attorneys, so insofar as courts defer to in-house counsel in these matters,
deference to public clients on these issues would be consistent and appropriate. See Godesky,
supra note 16, at 617 (comparing governments to in-house counsel and describing in-house
counsels’ development of “best practices”).
85. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 474–78 (R.I. 2008); Cnty. of Santa
Clara v. Superior Ct., 235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010); State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert,
744 S.E.2d 625, 647–51 (W. Va. 2013); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Conway, 947 F. Supp. 2d
733, 739–44 (E.D. Ky. 2013); City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 14 C 4361, 2015 WL
920719 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2015); Am. Bankers Mgmt. Co. v. Heryford, 190 F. Supp. 3d 947 (E.D.
Cal. 2016), aff’d, 885 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2018); State v. Actavis Pharma, Inc., 167 A.3d 1277 (N.H.
2017).
86. There are two uncommon exceptions worth mentioning. First, some defendants have
made separation of powers arguments against public client contingency fee contracts, arguing
that only the legislature has power over state finances, so attorneys general have no right to enter
into contingency fee agreements with private counsel. Only Louisiana’s supreme court has accepted this argument. See Meredith v. Ieyoub, 700 So. 2d 478, 481–83 (La. 1997). Most courts
have rejected it. See Godesky, supra note 16, at 612 & n.147 (citing cases rejecting separation of
powers arguments against public client contingency fee contracts). The other exception to
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Government attorneys are often obliged to closely supervise attorneys
working for a contingency fee, which further challenges the arguments Lemos
raises. 87 While clients generally have an interest in overseeing the work done
by an attorney they hire, some courts have legally required that government
lawyers not cede control over litigation to hired private counsel but instead
provide strict oversight. 88 Specifically, two state supreme courts have insisted
that government attorneys maintain complete control over the case, including
veto power over private attorneys’ decisions and ongoing, personal involvement by a supervising government attorney throughout the litigation. 89 While
some commentators are skeptical about the viability of such oversight as an
actual means of controlling such litigation, 90 at least one judicial opinion summarily rejects such skepticism. 91
Courts have largely accepted these agreements as part and parcel of their
deference to government lawyers; public litigation’s gravitas appears to remain intact.
II.

THE “SEEK JUSTICE” OBJECTION TO PUBLIC CLIENT CONTINGENCY FEE
CONTRACTS

In many circumstances, public client contingency fee contracts appear
beneficial. Yet an important objection against these contracts is that they are
in tension with what is sometimes known as the “seek justice” principle. 92 This
principle of legal ethics uncontroversially applies to criminal prosecutors who
have an obligation to act with a level of neutrality and to avoid overzealousness
when pursuing cases. 93 Critics of public client contingency fee contracts
broaden this principle’s application, arguing that the “seek justice” principle
applies to public civil litigation, not just criminal enforcement. 94 These critics
argue that governments hiring outside counsel for a contingent fee violates
this principle because doing so would mean that public civil litigation would
be guided by the maximization of monetary recovery rather than justice. 95 If

courts’ acceptance of these arrangements arises in specific public nuisance cases and in eminent
domain contexts in California courts. The relevant decision—People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior
Court, 705 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1985)—has been narrowed, however. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at
35–36.
87. See Wilkins, supra note 44, at 440–44.
88. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 475; Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 38–41.
89. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 477; Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 40.
90. See Godesky, supra note 16, at 615; Lemos, supra note 12, at 553.
91. See Cnty. of Santa Clara, 235 P.3d at 39 (“[W]e decline to assume that private counsel
intentionally or negligently will violate the terms of their retention agreements by acting independently and without consultation with the public-entity attorneys or that public attorneys will
delegate their fundamental obligations.”).
92. See, e.g., People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Ct., 705 P.2d 347, 351–53 (Cal. 1985).
93. See Green, supra note 21, at 612–18.
94. See Redish, supra note 12, at 79–81.
95. See id. at 103–05.
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these critics are correct, even if public client contingency fee contracts offer
multiple benefits to government litigators and their constituencies, these arrangements are ethically objectionable.
Section II.A explains the “seek justice” principle, first by elucidating its
traditional application in the context of criminal prosecutions before laying
out why some believe it should also apply to public civil enforcement contexts.
Section II.B articulates critics’ argument that, in light of this principle, public
client contingency fee contracts are improper. After exploring critics’ concerns in this Part, Part III of this Comment will make clear that their objections are unsuccessful.
A. Criminal Prosecution, the Obligation to “Seek Justice,” and the Duties of
Government Civil Litigators
A criminal prosecutor’s obligation to “seek justice” is firmly entrenched
and widely accepted. 96 It has roots in Supreme Court precedent and in the
ethical codes of professional organizations. 97 But its applicability to public
civil litigation is more contested. 98
1.

Criminal Prosecutors’ Role and Obligations

While the meaning of the obligation to seek justice is not obvious on its
face, various authorities have agreed that, at a minimum, it prohibits the use
of contingency fee arrangements for criminal prosecution. 99 In Berger v.
United States, the Supreme Court sketched out the basic contours of a prosecutor’s duties:
[A prosecutor is the] representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 100

When representing the government, a criminal prosecutor must not only
avoid bending or breaking the rules to achieve victory at any cost but also operate as a representative of both the public and of a legal system aimed at doing
justice. 101 To do that, the prosecutor must balance competing goals, including
enforcing the law, avoiding conviction of the innocent, respecting the legal
process, and acting to promote proportionality and equality. 102
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See Green, supra note 21, at 612–18.
Id. at 614–16.
See infra Section II.A.2.
See supra Section I.A.1.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Green, supra note 21, at 633–34.
Id. at 634.
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Criminal prosecution’s role and its attendant ethical obligations differ
from other roles in the legal system. Those who represent private parties in
civil matters, for instance, do not often have roles defined in terms of the public interest, nor do they have the broad discretion prosecutors enjoy in criminal law. 103 Whereas the general counsel of a corporation can—within
boundaries—litigate to further their employers’ profitability and to undermine competitors, criminal prosecutors must act impartially and cannot be
motivated by personal or political bias. 104 Their goal is not to prevail but to do
justice, which is particularly relevant when those subject to criminal prosecution risk losing their liberty or even their life. 105
2.

Government Civil Litigators’ Role and Obligations

Some courts and scholars have advanced the more controversial claim
that public civil litigation also entails a duty to seek justice. 106 This Comment
does not take a position on this issue. Instead, for the sake of argument, it
grants this point to critics of public client contingency fee contracts in order
to expose the tensions between the “seek justice” principle and the position
these critics take.
Commentators point to the similarities between government lawyers in
both criminal and civil contexts to support the application of the “seek justice”
principle to public civil litigation. Public civil litigators, they contend, “represent[] a sovereignty whose interests include seeking justice, which seems no
less true in civil than in criminal litigation.” 107
No firm line can be drawn between government litigators pursuing criminal actions and those pursuing civil actions, some argue. Criminal cases often
involve weighty financial stakes and do not always implicate liberty, and civil
cases can be intended to punish, making it hard to distinguish between them
for ethical purposes. 108 According to this view, government lawyers ought to
dismiss civil enforcement actions they view as unjust to pursue, even if they
would be acceptable for an attorney to litigate on behalf of a private client. 109

103. Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV.
669, 669, 671–74.
104. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940).
105. Green, supra note 21, at 612, 614–15.
106. See, e.g., People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Ct., 705 P.2d 347, 352 (Cal. 1985); Steven K.
Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the
Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789 (2000); Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek
Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235 (2000). For the opposing view, see Lanctot,
supra note 28.
107. Green, supra note 106, at 277.
108. Redish, supra note 12, at 93.
109. See Green, supra note 106, at 246–48.
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There is a sense that even such public civil litigation is fundamentally different
from private litigation, which means that different obligations are involved. 110
Not everyone accepts this comparison, however. Professor Catherine
Lanctot argues that even in difficult cases where it would seem most likely that
a government lawyer’s role would differ from a private attorney’s role, they
ultimately have the same obligations. 111 In an adversarial system, she argues,
the government lawyer is not supposed to substitute their sense of fairness for
the courts’ judgment of the correct outcome of a case. 112
Furthermore, the law draws numerous distinctions between criminal and
civil litigation. Criminal punishment is generally not as focused on direct
compensation of injured parties as is civil litigation. 113 While the Constitution
guarantees a right to counsel in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has not
read it to automatically confer such a right in civil contexts. 114 Criminal law
requires a higher burden of proof than civil law. 115 The consequences of criminal cases, on balance, are far more severe than those of civil cases. 116 In light
of all these differences, perhaps a duty to seek justice fits better in the more
punitive and severe context of criminal law rather than in civil cases where
compensation of injured parties is closer to the center of litigation.
Nonetheless, the idea that government lawyers—even in civil litigation—
have heightened duties to the public interest is a widespread and fairly conventional perspective. 117 Again, this Comment takes no position on the duties
of civil lawyers to the public interest. Instead, it focuses on how critics of public client contingency fee contracts draw the wrong implications from the
“seek justice” principle.
B. Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts and the Obligation to “Seek
Justice”
Relying on this widespread view that government lawyers must seek justice, prominent critics of public client contingency fee contracts, including
scholar Martin Redish, allege that such arrangements conflict with the “seek

110. See Lanctot, supra note 28, at 955–57 (collecting sources attributing heightened duties
to government lawyers in both civil and criminal contexts).
111. Id. at 957.
112. See id. at 958.
113. Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal–Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 201, 206 (1996).
114. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
115. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
116. See Robinson, supra note 113, at 203.
117. Lanctot, supra note 28, at 955; Berenson, supra note 106, at 789–90.
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justice” principle. 118 The logic of the argument is relatively simple. Government lawyers have heightened obligations to seek justice. 119 Insofar as their
powers are delegated to private counsel via public client contingency fee contracts, the obligations of government litigators must be applied to private
counsel—otherwise government attorneys could circumvent their ethical obligations through these arrangements. 120 As a consequence, just as government attorneys must focus on the public interest rather than their “personal
financial interests,” so too must private attorneys working on behalf of the
state. 121 Redish contends that “prophylactic” measures are important to protect against problematic incentives in government contexts. 122 The incentives
in public client contingency fee contracts tempt lawyers “to make litigation
choices that further their personal financial interests,” leading them to maximize their monetary recovery rather than pursue justice. 123 They may be torn
between their loyalties to concurrent private clients with interests in the public
client’s litigation, and they may prioritize monetary relief even when nonmonetary relief is more appropriate. 124 While a government attorney seeking justice might drop a case, seek an injunction, or pursue less than the maximum
possible monetary settlement, a private attorney working for a contingency
fee is incentivized to maximize recovery. 125
If all these concerns are correct, as a prophylactic measure aimed at preserving government civil litigation’s ethical integrity, public client contingency fee contracts should be treated as impermissible. Despite their apparent
promise and the good they might accomplish, professional ethics foreclose
these arrangements as an option, at least according to these critics. As Part III
of this Comment will demonstrate, however, these objections to public client
contingency fee contracts are misplaced.

118. See Redish, supra note 12, at 79–81.
119. Berenson, supra note 106, at 789. This heightened obligation is often justified on the
basis of the extraordinary power of litigators acting in the role of legal enforcers, as well as based
upon government litigators’ role as representatives of a sovereign with the goal of achieving justice. See Green, supra note 21, at 625, 633–34.
120. Redish, supra note 12, at 94–95.
121. See id. at 92.
122. Id. at 90–91.
123. Id. at 105.
124. Dana, supra note 6, at 323–28.
125. See id. at 323. These issues are not unique to public client cases litigated by private
counsel, but they can also arise in private class actions where courts have developed tools to
manage these conflicts. See, e.g., In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust
Litig., 330 F.R.D. 11, 30–31 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (bifurcating a class action into an injunctive and a
damages class with separate representation).

October 2022]

Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts

163

III. THE OBLIGATION TO FORM PUBLIC CLIENT CONTINGENCY FEE
CONTRACTS
The opposite of Redish and other critics’ conclusions is true: government
attorneys are not only allowed to enter into public client contingency fee contracts but they are sometimes obligated to do so. Critics of these arrangements
focus on negative obligations related to the “seek justice” principle and ignore
the affirmative obligations the principle entails. 126 At the same time, they exaggerate the insuperability of the hazards public client contingency fee contracts present. 127 The very principles these critics rely upon undermine their
arguments. 128
Further, government litigators have duties under the public trust doctrine
that are distinct from the obligation to “seek justice,” and these duties also
support affirmative obligations to initiate such contracts. 129 Under both of
these doctrines, government litigators are sometimes obligated to enter into
public client contingency fee contracts.
Section III.A explains that the “seek justice” principle—even in the criminal law context—not only involves the negative obligations critics of public
client contingency fee contracts emphasize but also creates affirmative obligations to bring suit. In light of these points, Section III.B argues that if the “seek
justice” principle applies in civil contexts, affirmative obligations to bring suit
will arise there as well. Section III.C argues that discharging these affirmative
obligations will, in some circumstances, create a corresponding obligation to
form public client contingency fee contracts. Further, Section III.D contends
that the public trust doctrine also generates obligations to form public client
contingency fee contracts.
A. Affirmative and Negative Obligations to “Seek Justice”
For good reason, those who discuss the duty to “seek justice” emphasize
the constraints this principle imposes on litigators. However, this focus leads
them to underemphasize the principle’s affirmative implications, including
the obligation to bring suit under certain circumstances. This Section addresses both negative and affirmative obligations in the context of criminal
law, setting up discussions of these obligations in civil litigation contexts in
the sections that follow.
Criminal prosecutions present the horrifying risk of wrongful convictions, and overzealousness in any aspect of prosecution can have devastating

126. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 12, at 95 (emphasizing concerns about insufficient limitations in public client contingency fee contracts); Godesky, supra note 16 (emphasizing neutrality as a limitation); Coffee, supra note 52, at 243–49 (emphasizing obligations related to
limiting the occurrence of conflicts).
127. See Wilkins, supra note 44, at 460 (suggesting these issues may likely be addressed
through lawyers’ “ethics and identity” rather than “structures and rules”).
128. See infra Section III.C.
129. See infra Section III.D.
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consequences. 130 In light of this risk, the duty to “seek justice” is often associated with the negative duty to act impartially and to avoid exercising power
and discretion in ways that might lead to unjust results. 131 When commentators consider this duty in civil contexts, they tend to emphasize the negative
duty to refrain from the single-minded pursuit of “victory” over a defendant,
in particular. 132 As a result, the Supreme Court’s admonition in Berger v.
United States not to let “innocence suffer” hangs heavily over conversations
about public client contingency fee contracts. 133
Yet in the same sentence, Berger states that the aim of prosecution is also
that “guilt shall not escape.” 134 That does not mean prosecutors are obligated
to convict every person who commits a crime; proper prosecutorial discretion
also involves choosing not to bring charges in many cases where a conviction
might otherwise be obtained. 135 Instead, Berger suggests that an affirmative
obligation to bring certain cases is implied in the “seek justice” principle, along
with the negative duty not to convict the innocent. Justice Robert Jackson articulated a useful version of this idea when he was attorney general: “What
every prosecutor is practically required to do is to select the cases for prosecution and to select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public
harm the greatest, and the proof the most certain.”136 The idea here is that
some cases are so important and strong that they must be brought.
The controversies that can arise when prosecutors choose not to bring
charges support the intuition that such an affirmative duty exists. One example stems from U.S. Attorney Alexander Acosta’s entry into a nonprosecution
agreement with Jeffrey Epstein, who was “accused of sexually abusing dozens
of underage girls,” in exchange for Epstein pleading guilty to less severe state
charges. 137 The decision not to bring charges sparked outrage and later led to
Acosta’s resignation from a cabinet position. 138 Without evaluating the merits
of Acosta’s specific decision, the discourse surrounding it suggests the public
recognizes an affirmative obligation to bring charges under some circum-

130. Melilli, supra note 103, at 671–72.
131. See, e.g., Green, supra note 21, at 635–36. The exercise of discretion is particularly
necessary due to the phenomenon of overcriminalization, which makes enforcement of every
violation not just impossible but also against the public interest. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–19 (2001).
132. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 12, at 89–90.
133. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
134. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
135. Melilli, supra note 103, at 674; Stuntz, supra note 131, at 512–19.
136. Jackson, supra note 104, at 5.
137. Michael Balsamo & Eric Tucker, Justice Dept.: ‘Poor Judgment’ Used in Epstein Plea Deal,
AP NEWS (Nov. 12, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/jeffrey-epstein-florida-e2a4431f7319afd037
023d9a586aa291 [perma.cc/PH3U-7V5Z].
138. Annie Karni, Eileen Sullivan & Noam Scheiber, Acosta to Resign as Labor Secretary over
Jeffrey Epstein Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/us/politics/acosta-resigns-trump.html [perma.cc/M9T3-VLW7].
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stances, which is also consistent with Justice Jackson’s comments. Beyond Epstein, one can easily see how other prosecutors’ decisions to ignore sexual violence or financial crimes committed by powerful actors might clash with the
“seek justice” principle by virtue of failing to uphold the affirmative obligations it entails. 139
For prosecutors, then, some cases are obligatory under the “seek justice”
principle, just as some will be impermissible (when the defendant is known to
be innocent, for example) and others will be subject to discretion (when guilt
is clear, but a case involves a judgment call about how best to expend resources).
B. The Affirmative Obligation to “Seek Justice” in Government Civil
Litigation
If, as critics of public client contingency fee contracts suggest, government
civil litigators have heightened ethical obligations compared to private attorneys, then they too will have affirmative obligations under the “seek justice”
principle akin to criminal prosecutors. The following hypothetical illustrates
this point.
Imagine a situation where a statute empowers a state’s attorney general to
enforce certain consumer protection provisions, such as rules related to the
use of consumer data. 140 A business intentionally and egregiously flouts these
provisions, as clearly revealed in documents leaked by a whistleblower. Perhaps the business discriminates against consumers who exercise their privacy
rights by opting out of data collection, charging them higher prices, or refusing to sell them essential goods like credit, housing, or utilities. 141 Maybe an
app sells personal information about users without notice or an opportunity
to opt out, potentially threatening their livelihoods. 142 Financial losses ensue,
139. See Lisa Avalos, Prosecuting Rape Victims While Rapists Run Free: The Consequences of
Police Failure to Investigate Sex Crimes in Britain and the United States, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1,
6 (2016); Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html
[perma.cc/4QHC-ATH2].
140. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155 (West 2022); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-584 (Supp.
2022) (effective Jan. 1, 2023). Attorneys general can also be charged with enforcing laws against
unfair or deceptive trade practices, including those related to issues like price gouging. See, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.903, 445.910 (West Supp. 2022); see also Christine Ferretti,
Nessel Warns Benton Harbor Residents to Watch for Price Gouging on Bottled Water amid Lead
Crisis, DET. NEWS (Oct. 15, 2021, 7:11 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2021/10/15/benton-harbor-bottled-water-price-gouging-dana-nessel-lead-pipescrisis/8474925002 [perma.cc/5BQF-3D2B].
141. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125 (West 2022) (banning such discrimination).
142. See, e.g., id. § 1798.120 (banning the sale of data without notice or the opportunity to
opt out). Such issues are especially salient with respect to dating apps or other businesses that
collect sensitive information. See, e.g., Marisa Iati & Michelle Boorstein, Case of High-Ranking
Cleric Allegedly Tracked on Grindr App Poses Rorschach Test for Catholics, WASH. POST (July 21,
2021, 10:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2021/07/21/catholic-official-grindrreaction [perma.cc/7HYE-478L].
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very seriously harming large numbers of people in a jurisdiction. As in Justice
Jackson’s formulation, it is appropriate to say, “the offense is the most flagrant,
the public harm the greatest, and the proof the most certain.”143 Perhaps the
relevant statute does not allow private individuals to sue, 144 or users of the
service are bound by forced arbitration waivers that make private lawsuits difficult, if not impossible. 145
If the “seek justice” principle applies to litigators in this government
agency, then absent compelling countervailing considerations, bringing this
case is obligatory. Because this principle entails both negative and affirmative
obligations, it is not merely permissible to bring such a case, but it is actually
part of the ethical responsibility of someone representing the state in litigation.
C. The “Seek Justice” Principle Creates an Affirmative Obligation to Form
Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts
Insofar as government civil litigators have an obligation to “seek justice”
by bringing certain lawsuits, they will also be obliged, at times, to form public
client contingency fee contracts. This result is likely to surprise commentators
like Redish who rely on this principle to attack such contracts. Not only are
critics wrong to claim that these agreements violate professional ethics, but
they overlook the implication that the principles of professional ethics they
cite actually require such agreements.
To see why, it is useful to slightly alter the facts of the hypothetical case
from the previous Section. Imagine the same egregious violations are presented to the state attorney general. Given the scale of the case and their office’s funding, staffing levels, and expertise in the area of law, however, they
are wary of taking it on. Additionally, private law firms with greater resources
regularly litigate cases against the industry implicated in the case. These law
firms have adequate staffing, in addition to having superior expertise in this
area of law. The government agency believes the case is strong and justifies a
sizeable monetary settlement for the affected parties, but there are risks involved. The costs to bring the suit are high, and it is hard to predict how long
the case will take, particularly since the alleged offender has made every indication they will litigate the case to the fullest extent possible.
In this instance, the government litigator has an obligation to bring the
case but confronts a number of obstacles to doing so: resource scarcity, inadequate staffing and expertise, and uncertainty about the risks involved in undertaking the case. If they were to enter into a public client contingency fee

143. Jackson, supra note 104, at 5.
144. The Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, for example, gives the state attorney
general “exclusive authority” to enforce rules related to the use of consumers’ personal data,
meaning consumers have no private right of action. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-584(A) (Supp. 2022)
(effective Jan. 1, 2023).
145. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 13, at 626–30.
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contract, they could feel assured that the lawsuit would be brought adequately.
Without such an arrangement, they would be unable to proceed with confidence. As courts have recognized, “the ability of [a government litigator] to
enter into such contractual relationships may well, in some circumstances,
lead to results that will be beneficial to society—results which otherwise might
not have been attainable.” 146 Meeting the affirmative obligation to “seek justice” therefore requires forming public client contingency fee contracts.
Importantly, this hypothetical is not some fantastical possibility but is a
reality of government litigation. At least one commentator has described local
governments in the opioid litigation as being in precisely this position. 147 Local governments have incurred serious costs and harms due to the opioid crisis, but they often face even greater budgetary constraints than states, making
public client contingency fee agreements necessary for them to bring suit.148
At the time of this writing, because of the assistance of private counsel paid
through contingency fees, heavily impacted rural Texas counties have an opportunity to get direct access to pending settlements. 149 Contingency fee lawyers enabled this direct local access to settlement funds, a result that stands in
contrast to the distribution of funds in the tobacco litigation, during which
municipalities were minor players. 150 Instead of states spending settlement
money on issues unrelated to the litigation, as they did in the wake of the tobacco litigation, here local governments will receive substantial funds to fight
opioid addiction locally. 151

146. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 475 (R.I. 2008).
147. Lance Gable, Preemption and Privatization in the Opioid Litigation, 13 NE. U. L. REV.
297, 322–325 (2021).
148. See id. at 310, 312–13; Nino C. Monea, Cities v. Big Pharma: Municipal Affirmative
Litigation and the Opioid Crisis, 50 URB. LAW. 87, 96–97, 111 (2019).
149. See Brandon Mulder, Bastrop County to Join List of Plaintiffs Suing Opioid Makers,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Aug. 29, 2019, 1:12 PM), https://www.statesman.com/story/news/local/bastrop/2019/08/29/bastrop-hays-caldwell-prepare-to-join-list-of-counties-suing-opioidmakers/4354108007 [perma.cc/F8NH-UXQ8] (“ ‘We’re all strapped for cash as it is,’ said Caldwell County Judge Hoppy Haden. ‘If it wasn’t for being able to do it on a contingency fee basis,
I can tell you certainly our county wouldn’t have been able to enter into it, because we couldn’t
afford to pay.’ ”); Nate Raymond, J&J Strikes $297 Million Texas-Specific Opioid Settlement,
REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2021, 3:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/jj-strikes-297-million-texas-specific-opioid-settlement-2021-10-26 [perma.cc/59K3-LS94].
150. See Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1233–34 (2018).
151. Jan Hoffman, States Clash with Cities over Potential Opioids Settlement Payouts, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/health/opioids-litigation-settlement.html [perma.cc/5TVM-FL2K] (“[M]uch of the [tobacco settlement] money went to discretionary funds of state legislatures. Especially in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, hefty
amounts were redirected to balancing budgets and fixing potholes, rather than to local prevention and treatment programs. Still bitter about those outcomes, communities whose coffers had
been depleted by the opioid crisis decided to sign with private lawyers, circumventing the
states.”); Micah L. Berman, Using Opioid Settlement Proceeds for Public Health: Lessons from the
Tobacco Experience, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1029, 1035, 1037 (2019). Notably, in the opioid litigation,
both state and local plaintiffs are expected to reach settlements that require awards to be used
for abatement purposes. See Nate Raymond, U.S. State Officials Urge Support for Landmark
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D. The Public Trust Doctrine Creates an Affirmative Obligation to Form
Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts
Not only does the “seek justice” principle create an affirmative obligation
to form public client contingency free contracts, but the public trust doctrine
also imposes this obligation on government litigators. State attorneys general
and other government lawyers have affirmative obligations to bring suit based
on the public trust. 152 This Section will show that these public trust-based obligations are sufficient to support an obligation to form public client contingency fee contracts. Though there may also be other foundations for this
obligation, this Comment focuses on the “seek justice” principle and the public trust doctrine. The availability of both of these justifications is worth noting, given that this Comment is agnostic about whether the “seek justice”
principle applies to government civil litigation. Instead, it grants this assumption to critics of public client contingency fee contracts in order to reveal how
these critics’ own premises indicate there is an obligation to form such contracts. The public trust doctrine, as discussed in what follows, further supports
the existence of the obligation to form public client contingency fee contracts.
The public trust doctrine imposes duties to the public on state governments. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court found the
state holds certain types of property “in trust” for its people, such that the
property must always remain under state control and protection, only to be
conveyed to private parties consistent with that public trust. 153 This evolving
doctrine has differing contours from state to state. 154 Commonly, the public
trust doctrine applies to natural resources like navigable waterways and wildlife. 155 The doctrine is generally used by private citizens to restrict government
action that is inconsistent with its public trust obligations, such as permanently giving certain natural resources away for the sole benefit of private interests. 156
The public trust doctrine can provide a basis for the government to bring
suit; state governments are obligated to protect certain resources, and the previously discussed doctrine of parens patriae enables them to discharge these
obligations. Parens patriae means the state has a “quasi-sovereign interest” in
these resources such that it has standing to sue, even when no single individual
in the state enjoys such standing. 157 As one court put it, “if the State is deemed
to be the trustee of the waters, then, as trustee, the State must be empowered
$26 Billion Opioid Settlement, REUTERS (July 21, 2021, 2:26 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation-idCAKBN2ER25S [perma.cc/X7JN-D8XT].
152. See, e.g., State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974).
153. 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
154. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as
the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 57, 70–71, 74 (2005).
155. Id. at 72.
156. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
157. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980).

October 2022]

Public Client Contingency Fee Contracts

169

to bring suit to protect the corpus of the trust—i.e., the waters—for the beneficiaries of the trust—i.e., the public.” 158 This obligation also extends to seeking damages on the public’s behalf when, for example, pollution harms the
wildlife or waters the state holds in trust.159 While this doctrine can be read
narrowly, its flexibility also affords it a broader reading. Arguably, the state’s
obligations go beyond navigable waters and other traditional categories to a
broader array of resources, including perhaps even the atmosphere. 160
Regardless of the public trust doctrine’s breadth, it can generate a government obligation to sue independent from any obligation that the “seek justice”
principle might impose. This obligation arises, at least in part, from the special
position of the state as the only party that can seek a remedy to wrongdoing
in some situations. In a case where an oil spill allegedly killed 30,000 birds, for
instance, the court noted that the state was the only party in a position to sue:
“no individual citizen could seek recovery for the waterfowl, and the state certainly has a sovereign interest in preserving wildlife resources.” 161
There are likely to be other scenarios in which the state occupies such a
position, including cases where the public trust doctrine is not at issue. For
example, if citizens are precluded from bringing a lawsuit by mandatory arbitration clauses, the state may nonetheless be able to sue on their behalf and
thus may be the only party that has standing to bring such a suit.162 Though
the foregoing does not firmly establish an obligation to sue in such cases, the
justifications for a state’s obligations under the public trust doctrine suggest
such obligations may also arise in other cases where the state is the only party
positioned to sue.
At any rate, the state’s obligations under the public trust doctrine may
only be possible to honor by retaining outside counsel for much the same reasons previously discussed in the context of the “seek justice” principle. Sometimes acting as a fiduciary of the public trust and seeking damages in the wake
of injury to public resources will demand more than the resources available to
public civil enforcers. 163 As with the previous discussion in the context of the
“seek justice” principle, there may be cases where suits for damages on behalf
of the public trust require specialized expertise, more staffing, or greater financial resources than are available. In these cases, hiring an attorney based

158. Md. Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (D. Md. 1972).
159. See State v. City of Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974) (“[W]here the
state is deemed to be the trustee of property for the benefit of the public it has the obligation to
bring suit not only to protect the corpus of the trust property but also to recoup the public’s loss
occasioned by the negligent acts of those who damage such property . . . .”); Amerada Hess Corp.,
350 F. Supp. at 1067.
160. See Sax, supra note 156, at 556–57; Kanner, supra note 154, at 82; Mary Christina
Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present
and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENV’T
L. 43, 80–81, 83–84 (2009).
161. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. at 40.
162. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 13, at 658–68.
163. See supra Section III.C.
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on a contingency fee may be, in effect, the only way to remedy harm to public
resources. 164 The public trust doctrine obligates governments to hire contingency fee attorneys in some cases, in addition to any obligations the “seek justice” principle imposes.
CONCLUSION
In arguing against public client contingency fee contracts, commentators
have overstated the problems associated with these arrangements and missed
the ways their own commitments demand the use of such agreements. Governments have an obligation to retain contingency fee attorneys in some circumstances, given the two potential grounds discussed in this Comment: the
“seek justice” principle and the public trust doctrine. There may also be other
principles that trigger this obligation, though surveying every possibility goes
beyond the scope of this discussion.
What is clear is that there are some cases that governments simply must
bring either as a matter of justice or their fiduciary obligations under the public trust doctrine. In a world of limited budgets, it is inevitable that agencies
with the power to litigate on behalf of the public must retain private counsel
via contingency fee agreements to fulfill these duties. Such arrangements are
not without risks, including corruption or general failure to further the public
interest. Nonetheless, these risks are possible to mitigate, as courts have recognized. Not only that: in some circumstances, forming public client contingency fee contracts is obligatory.

164. See Kanner, supra note 154, at 59–60 (discussing the benefits of contingency fee arrangements in these contexts).

